The Efficiency of Producing Alcohol for Energy in Brazil: Comment
In a 1982 issue of this journal, Michael Barzelay and Scott R. Pearson examined the social costs and benefits of producing ethanol motor fuel in Brazil.' They conclude that ethanol fuel was economically infeasible in 1981 and will remain so unless petroleum prices rise dramatically in the future. We seek first to call attention to some problems in their data and second to suggest that their analysis include broader considerations. Quite different conclusions could result. First, COPERSUCAR, in addition to being a first-class agricultural research institute, represents the political interests of its sugar mill owners. A key lobbying effort arises before each harvest when the federal government sets official prices for sugarcane, sugar, and ethanol. Clearly, it is in the interests of the cooperative to promote high prices for its outputs of sugar and ethanol, and it thus annually publishes its expected costs well in advance of the pricing decision. Barzelay and Pearson correctly note this fact and reduce COPER-SUCAR's reported costs by 20% "to compensate for the suspected overestimation of the published data" (p. 135). It is unclear how the authors arrive at the 20% figure, and the issue of ethanol efficiency appears rather sensitive to this parameter (see n. 9 below). table 2 ). The anhydrous ethanol production was indeed viable in 1980-81, and the net social loss in hydrated ethanol was almost one-half that reported in the original article.9
Ethanol Costs of Production Data
The conclusion that hydrated ethanol is not economical is borne out by other research. 1 However, though Barzelay and Pearson note some of the beneficial externalities arising from hydrated ethanol production, they are arguably not the most important.
Externalities
Proilcool is the Brazilian National Alcohol Program. Although many of its social objectives have not been realized," key strategic and economic goals are closer to fulfillment as a result of ethanol production.
National Energy Security
Brazil imported about 80% of the petroleum it needed in 1980, and 79% of these imports came from the Middle East. 12 The first strategic benefits of ethanol were realized sooner than expected when war broke out between Iran and Iraq in September 1980. Virtually overnight, 40% of petroleum imports were cut off. A difficult period ensued, but by raising the proportion of alcohol in gasoline to 30%, instituting conservation measures, and making spot purchases df petroleum, a major economic and political crisis was averted. This year ethanol is expected to substitute 37% for gasoline, according to official projections.13
Emphasizing production of export crops such as sugar or soybeans-instead of ethanol-to earn foreign exchange would have had disastrous results for Brazil because of the world recession and overproduction.14 Thus ethanol continues to provide a cushion of domestic liquid fuel, which contributes to national energy security.15 11. The alcohol program had ambitious social objectives for rural areas, such as more balanced interregional growth, improved opportunities for small farmers, and the creation of rural industrial employment to reduce migration to cities. Proilcool will create about 30,000 jobs in distilleries and 270,000 jobs in agriculture, according to Borges. Still, Barzelay and Pearson correctly note that "most of the incremental alcohol production has taken place on large plantation-mill-distillery complexes in the relatively wealthy central-south" (p.
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Proilcool was instrumental in maintaining automotive
